Update, Dec. 30: Reuters published this graphic, which is superb and self-explanatory. The full story is here.
Update 2. Dec. 31: A new Reuters article has some important detail about the location of the localizer vis-a-vis the runway and apron. Excerpts:
- Comments in the airport’s operating manual, uploaded early in 2024, said the embankment was too close to the end of the runway and recommended that the location of the equipment be reviewed during a planned expansion.
- “Unfortunately, that thing was the reason that everybody got killed, because they literally hit a concrete structure,” Captain Ross Aimer, the chief executive of Aero Consulting Experts, told Reuters. “It shouldn’t have been there.”
- Muan International Airport’s Operations Manual said the navigation equipment, or localisers, had been installed too near the end of the runway, or just 199 m (218 yards) from the crash site.
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South Korean officials have previously said the structure was about 250 m (273 yards) from the end of the runway itself, though a paved apron extends past that.
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The runway design did not meet industry best practices, however, said John Cox, chief executive of Safety Operating Systems and a former 737 pilot, adding that they preclude any hard structure like a berm within at least 300 m (330 yards) of the end of the runway.
By Scott Hamilton
Commentary
Dec. 30, 2024, © Leeham News: The Dec. 29 (local time) accident of Jeju Flight 2216 is a tragedy that didn’t have to happen.
It’s far too soon to say what caused the emergency on the airplane. Within hours a host of theories emerged about the cause. The airport fire chief blamed the accident on a bird strike (singular). I’ve never heard of a single bird strike bringing down an airliner. Multiple bird strikes have brought down airliners going back to the propeller days. In recent history, US Airways 1549—the flight that Capt. Chesley Sullenburger and co-pilot Jeff Skiles safely landed in the Hudson River—is the most famous example.
Korean and assisting investigators will reveal if 2216 suffered multiple strikes that caused power to both engines to quit, as happened with 1549. The flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) should put this to rest. The analysis of these should also reveal why the landing gear, slats and flaps were not extended. The cockpit resource management (CRM) will be analyzed as well to understand the coordination between the two pilots.
Whatever the reason for the emergency landing, the incontrovertible cause for the disaster that befell the plane was the presence of a berm and concrete structure of the runway localizer a short distance from the end of the runway. This structure should never have been constructed in this manner. Having been done, it should have been later removed and replaced by a structure that would not have been disastrous to the emergency flight.
I’m optimistic that the initial readout of at least one of the flight recorders will be available this week. One of the recorders was damaged and is being sent to the US National Transportation Safety Board in Washington (DC) for analysis. (It was not revealed which one at this writing.)
In the meantime, a wide list of topics will be investigated. These include but are not limited to:
What investigators will look at
- Mechanical condition of the airplane, especially considering the wheels-up and flaps-up landing, looking for hydraulic failures.
- Maintenance records of the aircraft, including how recent any inspections were conducted and what conditions might have been discovered.
- The engine maintenance records, with focus on the right engine apparent compressor stall and if a bird strike or other mechanical issue contributed to the accident. A physical breakdown of the engine will be conducted.
- The health records of the flight crew and whether any alcohol or drugs were in their systems (I emphasize, this is routine).
- The operational records of the flight crew.
- The cockpit voice recorder, flight data recorder and radio communications with Air Traffic Control.
- Weather conditions, even though the video appears there were no storms; but winds will be considered whether these were factors.
- The South Korean regulator has prime investigative responsibility. It is common practice for Boeing and the engine maker (in this case CFM (a 50-50 joint venture of GE and France’s Safran) to send their own investigation teams to assist the governing authority.
- A review of the backgrounds of the cabin crew and passengers is also routine, to see how the cabin crew handled the emergency.
Safety of the 737-800
As I’ve been interviewed by media about this accident, I’ve been asked several times about the safety record of the Boeing 737-800. It’s superb. A statistical analysis by Boeing that it does regularly shows the 737NG series (of which the 737-800 is a part) has one of the lowest accident rates since the jet age began. This chart, through 2022, is below.
Source: Boeing Commercial Airplanes. Click on image to enlarge.
I’ve also been asked about whether this accident will hurt Boeing’s recovery. It shouldn’t, because this is almost certainly not about the airplane’s manufacturing process. It’s about environmental factors (the birds), engine performance, the landing configuration and the presence of that localizer construction method and location.
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