On September 20, 2026, Hans-Hermann Hoppe gave a talk at the twentieth annual meeting of his Property and Freedom Society, held as it is every year at a resort hotel in Bodrum, Turkey. When the society posted the recording on October 25, a clip began circulating widely, mostly because of one passage.
The clip as it circulated on X, posted October 26 by The PFBC Media (the caption is theirs). The full video of the talk is on the Property and Freedom Society’s YouTube channel.
Explaining why Europeans are wrong to compare Israel’s war in Gaza to the Holocaust, Hoppe told his audience:
To compare what happens to Gaza and then, the so-called Holocaust, as far as the Holocaust is concerned, if you deny the teeniest detail in the official narrative of the Holocaust in Germany, you will be jailed. Despite the fact that nobody I’ve ever met, even among those people who are called Holocaust deniers, has ever denied that cruel, evil, ugly things happened during that period. But if you study these things a little bit more closely—again I learned that all from Rothbard too—there are huge holes in the story. There are lots of lies mixed into certain things that are undoubtedly true. There were never forensic investigations done in these places.
In other words, Hoppe objects to comparing Gaza to the Holocaust not because he thinks it overstates what is happening in Gaza but because he thinks it overstates the Holocaust. The cruelty in Gaza is documented on video, he says, whereas the evidence for the Holocaust “had large holes.”
(The passage above is transcribed from the full video of the talk; other quotations from the talk are from the edited transcript his society published alongside the recording.)
Much of the online commentary on the clip has gone off in unhelpful directions. So let me be clear about what’s actually objectionable about what Hoppe says here. It isn’t that he criticizes Israel’s conduct in Gaza. Many others, including serious scholars of genocide, have done the same, and criticizing the Israeli government is not antisemitism.
Nor is the problem (merely) his use of “so-called” to describe the Holocaust. Hoppe uses the phrase constantly, seemingly as a verbal tic. Elsewhere in the same talk he refers to “the so-called German guilt” and “the so-called Nuremberg trial.”
The real problem is the content of what he says. Hoppe grants, purely in the abstract, that “cruel, evil, ugly things happened,” while insisting that the specifics are riddled with “holes” and “lies” and claiming there were “never forensic investigations done in these places.” And the passage comes in the section of the talk he introduces as his “final and most controversial insight,” which opens with the claim that among those who “run the American government,” the group “of over proportional influence” is “the Jewish lobby,” and that “if you look at academia, all top positions are occupied by Jewish people.” All of this is the familiar rhetoric of Holocaust denial and distortion, very nearly line for line.
The forensic claim in particular is a familiar and demonstrably false trope. The forensic evidence exists, and is well-documented. In 1945 Polish investigators sent metal components from the Auschwitz gas chambers, along with samples of victims’ hair, to the Institute of Forensic Research in Kraków, where chemical tests detected cyanide compounds. The same institute tested the site again in the early 1990s in response to the claims of Holocaust deniers, again with positive results. But the historical record doesn’t rest on forensics alone. It rests also on the Nazis’ own documents, on the testimony of perpetrators like the commandant of Auschwitz, and on the testimony of the people who survived. The bottom line is that there is simply no credible historical reason to doubt that what happened was not merely a few “cruel, evil, ugly things” but rather a systematic genocide in which some six million Jews, along with millions of others, were murdered by the Nazi state.
If you are hearing about Hoppe for the first time, the natural question is whether this is a lapse, an old man saying ugly things at the tail end of an otherwise serious career. My aim in this essay is to show you that it is not. Hoppe’s peculiar brand of libertarianism has always come packaged with a variety of noxious commitments about culture, race, and hierarchy that have no essential connection to libertarianism as such. In what follows, I will explain who Hoppe is, what he’s become famous for, and why the argument that made him famous can’t support the politics he has built on it.
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Hoppe is one of the most visible figures on the reactionary fringe of libertarianism, and the source of the “physical removal” slogan beloved by a certain kind of very-online young libertarian.
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His reputation as a serious thinker rests on “argumentation ethics,” which claims to demonstrate the soundness of anarcho-capitalism on purely a priori grounds. The demonstration is simple and memorable, but roundly rejected by the vast majority of philosophers, even those quite sympathetic to libertarianism.
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Hoppe’s politics blend libertarianism with what he calls a conservatism “of the most uncompromising kind.” He believes that liberty requires cultural homogeneity and that the inequality of cultures is “ineradicable,” and he has appealed to race science to explain why.
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He has written that communists and advocates of democracy must be “physically removed,” “if need be by violence,” and he has spent two decades running a forum where libertarians could hear from white nationalists and race scientists.
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His September 2026 talk in Bodrum, which casts doubt on the Holocaust and attributes outsized power to “the Jewish lobby,” is largely continuous with decades of writing and public lectures endorsing hierarchy and exclusion, race science, and provocative doubts about established, conventional wisdom.
Hoppe was born in West Germany in 1949 and earned his doctorate in Frankfurt under Jürgen Habermas, the great theorist of democratic deliberation. In 1986 he joined Murray Rothbard at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and over the following decades he became Rothbard’s leading intellectual heir and a fixture at the Ludwig von Mises Institute. His best-known book, Democracy: The God That Failed (2001), argues that monarchy is preferable to democracy (though also that both are inferior to anarchism) and that a genuinely libertarian order would be a patchwork of private covenant communities, each free to exclude whomever it likes.
Among some young libertarians, especially online and in radical anarcho-capitalist circles, Hoppe is venerated. He is “based.” His fans trade memes about “free helicopter rides,” a nod to the Pinochet regime’s practice of throwing political prisoners from aircraft, as a method of “physical removal.” The memes are pitched in the half-joking register that has come to dominate a certain corner of the internet, where irony makes it hard to say, and easy to deny, where the joke ends and the hatred begins.

Outside the Rothbardian and Austrian circles where he made his reputation, though, Hoppe’s name is largely unknown. Most mainstream political philosophers have never heard of him, and those who have rarely engage with his work. His admirers say that’s because the academy is a left-wing monoculture afraid of him. But there’s a better, simpler explanation. Hoppe’s central philosophical arguments just aren’t very good. In particular, “argumentation ethics” doesn’t come close to justifying libertarian rights. And even if it did, it wouldn’t do anything to justify the politics of exclusion he attaches to them.
Hoppe’s reputation as a philosopher rests above all on a single argument, which he calls argumentation ethics. What he claims for it is extraordinary. Argumentation ethics is supposed to provide a proof of the libertarian theory of property rights with the certainty of a geometric theorem. There’s no appeal to intuitions, no debate about consequences, and no balancing of competing moral claims. Just pure apodictic certainty. The proof runs roughly like this. Argument, says Hoppe, is an attempt to settle disagreements by persuasion rather than force. In order to engage in argument, each party must recognize the other’s exclusive control over his own body. You can’t try to persuade someone while treating his body as yours to control by force. To argue against self-ownership is therefore to engage in a kind of “performative contradiction,” much as you would by saying aloud that you cannot speak. And since self-ownership is the foundation of the whole libertarian theory of property, anyone who denies libertarianism refutes himself the moment he opens his mouth.
This would be a remarkable argument, if it actually worked! Wouldn’t it be amazing if even the fiercest critics of libertarianism were tacitly presupposing libertarianism, every time they open their mouths? Wouldn’t it be great if you could prove libertarianism to be true through sheer logic, without having to bother to inquire about the messy business of what consequences anarchism or a mixed economy actually produce in the real world?
Unfortunately for Hoppe, few scholars have been persuaded by his “proof.” Even among libertarians, who are more predisposed than most to agree with his conclusions, most respondents have concluded that argumentation ethics falls flat. The most rigorous statement of the basic problem comes from Danny Frederick, writing in Reason Papers in 2013. Imagine, Frederick suggests, a feudal assembly in which (1) serfs are allowed to speak and everyone, serfs included, recognizes their right to be heard, while (2) everyone also believes that the serfs’ bodies belong to their lord. Nothing about this situation is incoherent. My arguing with you requires, at most, that I treat you as free to take part in the argument. It does not require me to grant that you hold an enforceable right against the entire world to control your body, which is precisely the thing that libertarian self-ownership actually demands. There’s nothing logically inconsistent in my holding that you have the right to speak, but not the right to sell your labor, or your kidney. In the vocabulary of the legal theorist Wesley Hohfeld, which Frederick borrows, arguing requires at most that we treat each other as having a liberty to speak, while self-ownership is a bundle of claim rights. Frederick concluded that the failure of Hoppe’s arguments “seems comprehensive.”
Frederick is far from alone. Robert Murphy and Gene Callahan likewise reject Hoppe’s argument, noting that using your body to argue no more proves you own your body than standing on a patch of ground while arguing proves you own the ground. Roderick Long and Marian Eabrasu have found other holes. And even Hoppe’s sympathizers concede that the basic argument doesn’t work. A 2023 defense of the argument begins by admitting that “no one has managed to cross the gap between use and ownership,” before going on to propose yet another patch to the leaky vessel.
But put those objections to the side for the moment, and suppose that the argument did work. What would it get us? At most, argumentation ethics gets us a strong right of self-ownership and the libertarian theory of property built on it. Those rights would allow owners to exclude people from their property for any reason, good or bad. But none of that says anything about who owners should exclude. And it certainly doesn’t make the exclusion of certain categories of people the point of property. Nothing in libertarianism tells you that democrats are dangerous neighbors, that homosexuality threatens civilization, or that some cultures are inferior to others. You can be a libertarian and believe in property rights and nevertheless (or because of those beliefs) hold that a free society is a pluralistic one, in which people very unlike each other can live side by side. If Hoppe ends up somewhere else, it isn’t argumentation ethics, or the libertarian theory of property it’s supposed to yield, that gets him there.
In Democracy: The God That Failed, Hoppe writes that “there can be no tolerance toward democrats and communists in a libertarian social order. They will have to be physically separated and expelled from society.” The same goes, he continues, for “the advocates of alternative, non-family and kin-centered lifestyles such as, for instance, individual hedonism, parasitism, nature–environment worship, homosexuality, or communism,” who “will have to be physically removed from society, too, if one is to maintain a libertarian order.”
Hoppe’s defenders like to claim that these passages are taken out of context. After all, Hoppe is not calling for a state to round up gays and Democrats. He is describing a stateless world of private covenant communities, whose members agree to their rules in advance. Most libertarians accept that a voluntary community can set restrictive terms of membership and so, they argue, Hoppe is just explaining a basic libertarian commitment to free association. Nothing to see here.
The trouble is that Hoppe doesn’t stop at describing what such communities may do. He tells us what they should do, and his point isn’t confined to covenants. In the same chapter he urges libertarians to “reassert and exercise” their “right to exclusion in everyday life,” and to “distinguish themselves from others by practicing (as well as advocating) the most extreme form of intolerance and discrimination against egalitarians, democrats, socialists, communists, multiculturalists, environmentalists,” and others. That is a positive program of social exclusion, not a mere theory about what property permits in the abstract.
Hoppe’s program rests on premises that have nothing to do with argumentation ethics, and Hoppe laid several of them out in a 2017 speech to his society titled “Libertarianism and the Alt-Right.”
The first is that the principle of non-aggression isn’t sufficient to maintain a libertarian social order. A neighbor who aggresses against no one can still be a “bad” neighbor, Hoppe says, and since “you may not use violence against him,” the community must make him “a social outcast, so as to exert enough pressure on him to sell his property and leave.” But mere ostracism won’t always be enough. Neighbors “who openly advocate communism, socialism, syndicalism or democracy in any shape or form” must “not only be shunned, but they must, to use a by now somewhat famous Hoppe-meme, be ‘physically removed,’ if need be by violence.” Over the course of a few paragraphs, Hoppe has moved from the relatively innocent assumption that we can make, and act upon, moral judgments that go beyond the thin commitment to non-aggression, to the extraordinary and dangerous conflation of speech with aggression. Advocating democracy, he says, poses “an open threat to all private property and property owners.” But this is sophistry, of an especially dangerous variety. Arguing against private property is no more an attack on property owners than arguing for higher taxes is theft. Calling it a “threat” is a disturbingly Orwellian move, one that licenses violence against people who have done nothing more than express a dissenting political belief.
The second premise is that liberty requires homogeneity. “The peaceful cohabitation of neighbors,” he says, “requires also a commonality of culture: of language, religion, custom and convention,” and “multi-culturalism, cultural heterogeneity, cannot exist in one and the same place and territory” without ending in “the destruction of anything resembling a libertarian social order.”
And the third is hierarchy. Libertarians, he says, “must above all be realistic and recognize from the outset, as the Alt-Right does, the inequality not just of individuals but also of different cultures as an ineradicable datum of the human existence.” It’s clear enough what this means in practice. Immigrants should be screened for “cultural affinity,” “with the empirically predictable result of mostly, but by no means exclusively, western-white immigrant-candidates.” The “main addressees” of a populist libertarian message “must be indeed” the “dispossessed and disenfranchised native whites.” Police should crack down on street crime, and if most offenders “are young Black or Latino males,” then “so be it and such human specimen then should be the ones that most prominently get their noses bloodied.” In response to what he describes as violence and vandalism by antifascist protesters, he calls for “the police to be unleashed and this mob be beaten into submission.”
In fairness, Hoppe does warn against going all the way to white identity politics. It would be “a serious strategic error,” he says, “to make ‘whiteness’ the exclusive criterion on which to base one’s strategic decisions.” But this is merely a strategic objection. And the reasoning behind it is worse than the position it qualifies. Whiteness can’t be the dividing line, Hoppe explains, because it is “above all white men” who make up the ruling elite responsible for the present order. The groups he calls protected minorities (women, Blacks, Latinos, homosexuals, immigrants) benefit from that order, but “did not and do not possess the intellectual prowess that would have made this outcome possible.” In other words, his caveat about race rests on a hierarchy of its own, with white men at the top. The minorities can’t be the real enemy, because they aren’t capable enough to be.
None of these premises follows from libertarian principles. They are the familiar commitments of the nationalist right, attached to a libertarian theory of property and presented as though they were its natural fulfillment.
Hoppe’s most recent comments about the Holocaust were delivered under the auspices of the Property and Freedom Society, an organization founded by Hoppe in 2006 as an alternative to the Mont Pèlerin Society. One of Hoppe’s complaints about Mont Pèlerin, according to the historian Quinn Slobodian in Hayek’s Bastards, was that it allowed “no discussion…of any sensitive race issue.” The PFS would be different.
Take the 2010 meeting of the Society. After Hoppe’s welcoming remarks, the first talk was by the neo-Nazi Richard Spencer on “The ‘Alternative Right’ in America,” a movement Spencer had helped name two years before. Later that day Richard Lynn, the self-described “scientific racist,” spoke about “The Global Bell Curve,” after which Hoppe, Spencer, Lynn, and the others took questions together. At that meeting, according to Slobodian, Hoppe offered up his own contribution to racial anthropology, according to which equatorial peoples, who could live on “insects,” faced few challenges, while northern peoples were forged by hunting “big game.” In his 2017 speech Hoppe listed, with evident pride, the alt-right figures who had “appeared here at our meetings in the course of the years”: Paul Gottfried, Peter Brimelow, Richard Lynn, Jared Taylor, John Derbyshire, Steve Sailer, and Richard Spencer.
Viewed against this backdrop, Hoppe’s recent talk in Bodrum is simply the natural continuation of his intellectual trajectory. A political ideology organized around the idea of keeping the wrong people out eventually needs an account of who the wrong people are and why they hold so much power. Hoppe’s appeal to “the Jewish lobby” and the political and intellectual dominance of Jews is an old, familiar story. There is an irony here that many of Hoppe’s supporters seem to have missed. To many of them, the racism, the antisemitism, and the doubts about the Holocaust are signs of intellectual courage, a willingness to challenge conventional thinking. To everyone else, they look like the most conventional elements of a very old package. The only new thing about them is in some ways the most implausible one: the claim that they follow from the logic of liberty.
I have argued before that the boundaries of the libertarian tradition are wider and blurrier than libertarians like to pretend, and that it’s largely a waste of energy to fight about who is and who isn’t a “real” libertarian. I still think this is right. Like it or not, Hoppe is a libertarian, in the only sense the word reliably carries. He stands in a recognizable line of descent from Rothbard and his predecessors, and reasons in a recognizably libertarian idiom, drawing on and offering his own interpretations of the core concepts of that tradition. But nothing much of interest follows from this fact. Precisely because the libertarian tradition is so open to interpretation, being a libertarian is compatible with both good philosophical reasoning and bad, with political commitments that are admirable and with ones that are vile. Libertarians, just like anybody else, need to be judged not on the basis of a shared ideological label but on the basis of what they actually say and do.
So, if you are a young libertarian who has found something thrilling in Hoppe, here is what I’d ask you to consider. What is it that initially attracted you to the libertarian ideal? Was it the idea of self-ownership? The principle of non-aggression? Was it a suspicion of concentrated power? Whatever it was, I want you to consider how that commitment fits with the Hoppean ideas of cultural homogeneity, the embrace of hierarchy, the police “unleashed,” and the neighbors removed “if need be by violence.” Are these complementary parts of the same coherent worldview? Or are they fundamentally different ideas, drawn from distinct and possibly incompatible traditions?
Every libertarian has to answer, implicitly or explicitly, the question of what liberty is for. Hoppe provides one answer. For Hoppe, the purpose and value of liberty is to make space for small, homogeneous communities bound together by kin and custom, governed by natural elites, and organized around keeping out anyone who doesn’t fit. The alternative vision, the one that I embrace, is that of the open society. It is a vision of a world of strangers who share no religion or ancestry, and who work together despite these differences on terms of voluntary, mutually beneficial exchange. This second vision, I would argue, is the one the great thinkers of the classical liberal tradition actually defended. Adam Smith marveled that the humblest coat was the joint work of thousands of people who would never meet. Ludwig von Mises, a Jew who left Vienna in 1934 and fled Europe for the United States in 1940, built his social philosophy around the division of labor as the engine of peaceful cooperation across every boundary of nation and creed. Karl Popper, though not a libertarian himself, shared the libertarian skepticism of closed, exclusive systems and gave the positive vision its name. Libertarianism at its best belongs on the side of openness, tolerance, and peace.

