Beyond Preaching Unity and Inclusion: Observations from Syria’s Media and Online Spaces

The collapse of Bashar Al-Asad’s authoritarian regime (2000-2024) and the less-violent-than-expected capture of Damascus by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) brought joy to many Syrians. More importantly, it revived hope that this critical juncture in Syrian history could lead to meaningful transformation honouring the sacrifices of Syrians who endured torture, extra-judicial killing, bombardment, disappearance, and displacement. This essay highlights how media narratives surrounding unity and inclusion have manifested during the first 100 days of Syria’s transitional period (December 8, 2024—March 18, 2025), focusing on HTS’s rebranding media campaigns and situating the transitional government’s discourse within the broader context of the sectarianisation of the Syrian conflict since 2011.

State-controlled media were central to the old regime’s ideological apparatus in delegitimising opposition. Conversely, digital media–such as cell phones, Facebook, and YouTube–served as a central tool both for mobilising the rebelling population and enabling the notorious Syrian security forces to track down regime’s challengers.

The regime’s violent suppression of protesters and the militarisation of the uprising paved the way for regional actors and sectarian entrepreneurs to frame the uprising in sectarian-coded terms supporting their political agenda. By 2013, two factors led to militant sectarian identification: 1) Hezbollah and Iran’s direct military involvement, and 2) Islamist groups’ dominance over the nationalist Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated groups. By January 2017, one of these groups, Jabhat al-Nusra, which disaffiliated from al-Qaeda, formed a new Islamist coalition under the name HTS. After leading the offensive that toppled the regime on December 8, 2024, HTS launched a rebranding media campaign centring on unity and inclusion. Leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa distanced himself from his jihadist past, abandoning his nom de guerre (Abu Mohammad al-Julani), adopting Zelensky-style military attire, and later appearing in western-inspired suits.

Perhaps, the defining moment of the regime’s fall was the live broadcast of prisoners freed from the notorious Sednaya Prison, a powerful image uniting Syrians in solidarity with political prisoners. This bolstered HTS’s rebranding, supported by official statements promising to close all prisons and security facilities. Al-Sharaa’s media image evolved into that of a “unifier,”; “liberator,” and “saviour” of the “nation,” for domestic audiences, and as a savvy, pragmatic leader for international ones.

As media and politics scholars, we conducted digital ethnography during the first 100 days following the fall of the Al-Asad regime, to observe whether the new rulers’ official message of unity and inclusion translated into a meaningful  transformation. Early signs cast doubt on promises of transitional justice and a unifying Syrian identity. One area we observed was the ambiguity surrounding the transitional justice process and the transitional authority’s negligence of detention facilities, mass-graves, and the fate of over 177,000 forcibly disappeared persons. The transitional authority also avoided any direct reference to democracy, laid off hundreds of thousands of workers without providing economic alternatives, and sought to monopolise violence without establishing participatory and inclusive governance. A second cabinet that formed on March 29, 2025 was more diverse than the first one, but HTS retained control of key ministries, and only one woman was appointed among the 23-member cabinet.

For a sustainable and peaceful future, promoting a unified Syrian identity— while transitioning from a highly centralised to a decentralised model of governance—is crucial to addressing legacies of authoritarianism and countering divisive sectarian and ethnic narratives, as well as the local conditions, that fuelled the 14-year conflict.

Based on online observations, notable efforts by civil society groups— such as the Civil Peace Group in Homs—are working to mitigate tensions and prevent the escalation of conflict within their communities, both online and offline.

Many inauthentic online spaces, especially on Facebook and Telegram, promote exclusionary identities that threaten civil peace.

However, these groups face serious challenges from the spread of misinformation and disinformation. Many inauthentic online spaces, especially on Facebook and Telegram, promote exclusionary identities that threaten civil peace. One such group, “Independence of the Syrian Coast,” circulates unverified news and urges minorities to seek independence. The page advocates for the establishment of the “State of Ugarit” on the coast, deriving the name from the ancient port city “Ugarit” (15th-12th BCE) to evoke an imagined “non-Islamic” civilisational identity. It also urges the Sunni majority to form an “Umayyad state” in the remainder of Syria referencing the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE).

Recently, the official message of unity and inclusion has been severely shattered by massacres committed by government-aligned forces against Alawite civilians (March 6—10), lending credibility to inauthentic social media accounts that have capitalised on fear, mistrust, and insecurity in Syria.

Following an attack by pro-Asad insurgents against the government’s General Security forces near Jableh on March 6, unofficial calls for mobilisation and jihad triggered mass killings in which thousands of civilians were targeted in sectarian violence, accompanied by widespread plunder and the destruction of Alawite-owned properties. Amnesty International recently issued a damning report indicating that government-affiliated militias in the coastal city of Banias, deliberately killed civilians from the Alawite minority in gruesome reprisal attacks, which warrant investigation of these acts as potential war crimes.

Official media narratives continue to preach unity and inclusion while blaming atrocities on remnants of the Asad regime (al-fulūl). This was evident in Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani’s controversial speech at the Brussels IX Conference, ‘Standing with Syria’, on March 17 (2025), where he labelled the Asad family’s era as a “45 years of minority rule” which “led to the displacement of more than 15 million Syrians, the death of a million, and the oppression of the majority and other minorities.” Ironically, this narrative echoed that of al-Asad following the Syrian Uprising (March 2011), which blamed “armed gangs” and “infiltrators” for atrocities to discredit the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and provoke international intervention.

Moving forward, it is crucial to continue examining how media discourses of unity and inclusion are implemented in practice—either to support or to undermine stability and civil peace. Since al-Asad’s fall, regular broadcasting on Syrian state television has been suspended, forcing Syrians to rely on social media—particularly Telegram channels—as their primary source of official information about daily life. This shift has contributed to widespread disinformation and the circulation of rumours, prompting many Syrians to demand that the transitional government resume official communication via state television. Both digital and traditional ethnographic methods are essential for understanding the evolving social and political dynamics, as well as the role of media in instigating violence, spreading disinformation, and amplifying hate speech—factors that may contribute to the outbreak of further cycles of communal violence.

Featured image by – Kenny on Unsplash

Abstract: This essay traces how media narratives surrounding unity and inclusion have manifested during the first 100 days of the transitional period in Syria (December 8, 2024—March 18, 2025). We examine Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) strategic media rebranding campaigns and situate the transitional government’s discourse within the broader context of the sectarianisation of the Syrian conflict since 2011. Drawing on digital ethnography, we assess how the transitional government’s official promises of inclusion have been rendered untenable  by ongoing violence—most notably, the massacres of Alawite civilians by government-aligned forces (March 6—10, 2025). The essay also explores how competing narratives of Syrian national identity are unfolding—some articulated in opposition to narratives of particularistic and exclusionary sectarian and ethnic frameworks. We conclude by arguing that media narratives are central to understanding both the potential and limitations of this pivotal moment in Syria’s transition.