In the shifting political landscape of post-Asad Syria, global narratives surrounding political Islam are undergoing a recalibration, blurring engagement with legitimisation. More problematically, this shift normalises unelected leadership, like Ahmad al-Sharaa’s, undermining Syria’s democratisation prospects. This essay calls for a distinction between easing hard-line stances on political Islam and the endorsement of unelected leaders, highlighting the damaging effect of international normalisation on Syria’s complex political process. The concern is not about the participation of Islamists in governance per se, but about how international actors are shaping the recognition of specific leaders’ absent democratic processes.
The concern is not about the participation of Islamists in governance per se, but about how international actors are shaping the recognition of specific leaders’ absent democratic processes.
Mainstream media and foreign diplomacy have both contributed to the legitimisation of al-Sharaa as a political leader in post-Asad Syria. Media outlets like the CNN and the BBC have platformed al-Sharaa, discussing Syria’s future as if it were already under his control. Al-Sharaa, former nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Julani, has distanced himself from his jihadist past. Yet at the time of these visits, he remained the leader of a proscribed organisation accused of war crimes. Domestically, his appeal to the politics of affect— heightened by societal trauma, has driven his popularity. His adept avoidance of revealing much about his own ideology capitalises on the collective gratitude and euphoria following liberation from a tyrannical regime.
This media focus has been compounded by high-level visits from US and EU diplomats, at a time when al-Sharaa himself has acknowledged that neither he nor his military operation was solely responsible for Syria’s liberation. While al-Sharaa has publicly emphasised his commitment to pluralism and offered a timeline for democratic elections, critics argue that such international engagements marginalise diverse voices in Syria’s political transition. Even as the US and EU urge the formation of an inclusive government, critics remain sceptical of whether these demands are sufficiently enforced or genuinely representative. For Syrians, the question of whether al-Sharaa represents a necessary pragmatism or a dangerous legitimisation remains contested. Some argue his recalibration opens political space, while others warn it dilutes the Revolution’s democratic aspirations. Indeed, while finalising this article, al-Sharaa was appointed as Syria’s interim president in a closed meeting by the factions that overthrew Assad.
The early legitimisation of al-Sharaa’s leadership reflects colonial attitudes towards a populace deemed politically inferior and thus more tolerant of such transgressions.
For those seeking to justify it, diplomatic focus on al-Sharaa well before his appointment reflects his role as the primary authority in the new power structure post-Asad. This is attributed to his leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the dominant faction in the Radaa AlEdwan operation that overthrew the Asad government. This is understandable, given that democratic elections will take time, and the seismic shifts triggered by the ‘delayed’ success of the Syrian Revolution are of significant geopolitical and economic interest. However, it reflects colonial attitudes towards a populace deemed politically inferior and thus more tolerant of such transgressions. It also risks legitimising an unelected leader with an authoritarian past, undermining the goals of the Revolution. Furthermore, bypassing the newly instated ‘caretaker government’ signalled international disregard for the necessary stages of inclusive political development, complicating the country’s path toward democracy. The early legitimisation of al-Sharaa’s leadership was also shaped by regional actors like Turkey, which has long supported HTS, and Qatar, whose Emir was the first head of state to visit al-Sharaa the day after his presidential appointment (alongside domestic factions that had already positioned him as the de facto authority). Both represent regional trends toward neo-liberal Islamist governance with Infitah policies (a term originally used to describe Egypt’s 1970s economic liberalisation, now invoked more broadly to signal openness to global markets and strategic ideological malleability), where ideological flexibility facilitates politico-economic integration.
Equally, the recalibration of global narratives presents an opportunity to address Islamophobic biases. Portrayals of political Islam have perpetuated stereotypes with varying attention to tactical differences, ideological nuances, or contextual understandings, depending on (neo)colonial and geopolitical interests. Diplomatic engagement with proscribed actors, like al-Sharaa, complicates these reductive views. In many ways, political Islam became the primary ideological adversary in a neo-campist global order, dominated by Schmittian dichotomies of friend and enemy. After 9/11, the U.S. and European nations engaged with political Islam, including Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood under Morsi and Tunisia’s Ennahda party, but these, though temporary, were conducted within broader democratic frameworks. The Syrian case is particularly significant, as it involves the recalibration of political Islam associated with a formerly proscribed jihadist leader in the absence of any structured or inclusive political framework. Some diplomatic visits preceded the lifting of a significant bounty for information on al-Sharaa’s whereabouts, while the foreign terrorist designation on HTS stays in place and is described as a ‘separate process’.
It marks the first instance in a post-9/11 world where Islamist actors are being normalised in the absence of a negotiated framework, broad political representation, or mechanisms of accountability.
While historical precedents, such as the ANC and the IRA, illustrate shifts in international engagement with previously proscribed groups, the Syrian case differs in key ways. It marks the first instance in a post-9/11 world where Islamist actors are being normalised in the absence of a negotiated framework, broad political representation, or mechanisms of accountability. Though a national congress and a deal with the SDF have been cited as steps toward inclusion, the former has been criticised for its performativity and limited representativeness, and the latter for its secrecy and its fragility—particularly after the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria issued defiant statements in response to the new government formed by al-Sharaa on 30 March 2025. Meanwhile, concerns persist over the lack of transparency in investigating recent sectarian killings in the coastal region in March 2025.
Many youths in Syria, driven by desperation and trauma, joined militant factions not out of ideological alignment, but because such groups offered the necessary resources to fight or survive. Conviction may or may not follow.
Western engagement with the transitional government not only exposes inconsistencies in foreign policy but could signal a growing understanding of the complexities of factional loyalties, which often assumed ideological commitment, overlooking the pragmatic and resource-driven realities of militant recruitment in conflict zones. Perhaps underlying this increased comfort in dealing with Syria’s new rulers is an appreciation that recruitment is often driven by competition over resources, access to weapons, and military effectiveness. Many youths in Syria, driven by desperation and trauma, joined militant factions not out of ideological alignment, but because such groups offered the necessary resources to fight or survive. Conviction may or may not follow. Figures like Abdelbaset al-Saroot and al-Sharaa illustrate how militants sometimes shift allegiances based on shifting strategic interests, rather than ideological conviction. Patrick Baert argues that intellectual self-positioning is not just ideological but shaped by relational and competitive contexts. A similar logic can be applied to the militants’ positioning within ideological groups. Their affiliations are shaped not by some immutable inner self but by external pressures, resource availability, competition within a fragmented war landscape, and the seemingly immutable human thirst for power.
Domestically, while there is a broad base of support for al-Sharaa, the Syrian public sphere is vibrant, with discussions about a new constitution, political pluralism, democratic elections, and transitional justice. Supporting Syria’s democratisation requires recognising the complexities of the post-revolutionary context without reinforcing power structures that contradict the Revolution’s aspirations. Ultimately, it is up to the Syrian people—not external powers or armed factions—to determine their political future, whether Islamist or otherwise, through an inclusive and democratic process.
Featured image: Hadja Lahbib, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, meets with Ahmad al-Sharaa, January 2025. Credits: Image via Wikimedia Commons, licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International.
Abstract: This article focuses on recalibrating global narratives on Islamophobia and Political Islam in post-Asad Syria. It critically examines the legitimisation of a formerly proscribed Islamist leader, reflecting a shift in international diplomacy and media portrayals. At the same time, it considers opportunities for positive recalibration in addressing Islamophobia. By disentangling these competing dynamics, the essay argues for a clear distinction between challenging Islamophobia and the risks of legitimising unelected leadership.
