
Last week, the Supreme Court granted further review in Dix v. Caseyâs General Stores, Inc. (18-1464), a case under Iowaâs drug-testing statute (which covers alcohol testing too). In Dix, the Iowa Court of Appeals held among other things that two-light duty workers werenât in âsafety-sensitive positionsâ and that the statuteâs immunity protects employers only against claims based on third-party conduct. Caseyâs seeks further review of both rulings (plus one more).
In Dix, Caseyâs randomly drug tested workers from a pool of employees it had determined were in âsafety-sensitive positionsââa statutorily-defined term parroted in Caseyâs policy. Before testing, Caseyâs determined that all warehouse employees were in safety-sensitive positions, even those who performed âlight-duty assignmentsâ in an area cordoned off by a chain-link fence. It then used a third party to randomly select employees to test, administer the tests, and conduct a required medical review.
Three plaintiffs tested positive for drugs, two of whom had light-duty jobs. The thirdâs duties included operating a forklift and building palletsââheavy-duty tasks.â All three were fired, and they sued (along with one other employee).
The Court of Appeals ruled that the two light-duty workers werenât in safety-sensitive positions and thus had been improperly tested. Under the statute, a safety-sensitive position is as relevant âa job wherein an accident could cause loss of human life, serious bodily injury, or significant property or environmental damage.â Caseyâs raised a few arguments on this point, among them that all warehouse workers fit this definition because forklifts âzip[ped] aroundâ and boxes were stacked to the ceiling, so an accident could result in harm to any warehouse worker, duties no matter.
But the appeals court, like the district court, read the definition to focus on a workerâs duties. And because the light-duty employees, unlike their heavy-duty coworker, did not have âtasks where an accident could riskâ loss of life, injury, or damage, they did not come within the definition. In other words, the employees were not in safety-sensitive positions even if the âgeneral warehouse environment is dangerous.â
In its further-review application, Caseyâs points out that amicus curiae Iowa Association of Business and Industry had pressed for an application of the business-judgment rule. Â But Caseyâs argues primarily that the Court of Appeals misread the definition of âsafety-sensitive positionâ by ignoring the work environment.
Nothing about the statuteâs terms compels an exclusive focus on job duties.  If someone asked, âWhat do you do for a job?â it would not be unusual to respond, âI work in a factory.â  Or grocery store, or restaurant, and on and on. In other words, an ordinary speaker would deem it acceptable to identify the type of place where she worksâa component of job environmentâinstead of her jobâs duties. The circumstances in which one performs her work are often no less a part of how she conceives of her job than are its tasks.
Finally, itâs not at all impossible to imagine a light-duty employee under the influence of drugs or alcohol carelessly contributing to an accident with one of those zipping forklifts. Alcohol and drugs after all alter judgment and slow responses. In a generally dangerous environment, like the Caseyâs warehouse, even those whose duties arenât dangerous may be at risk of causing an accident. Caseyâs illustrates this point by suggesting that the Court of Appealsâ reading of the statute would seemingly exclude the janitor at a nuclear power plant from the definitionâs coverage.
Caseyâs also seeks further review of the Court of Appealsâ holding that the drug-testing statuteâs immunity provision as protects âemployers only from suit arising from third-party conduct.â As Caseyâs reads the immunity provision, it applies where an employer has (1) established a drug-testing policy; (2) initiated a testing program in accordance with the statute; and (3) tested or taken action in good faith. So Caseyâs argues that the immunity is broader than the Court of Appeals allowed.
Besides the provisionâs plain terms, Caseyâs emphasizes the Supreme Courtâs general instruction to read immunity provisions broadly. And a broad reading of the drug-testing statuteâs immunity provision is also consistent, Caseyâs argues, with a legislative intent to protect an employerâs right to a drug-free workplace.
In light of these factors, Caseyâs reading of the statute is reasonable. The drug-testing statute contains many âsafeguardsâ for employees. By immunizing all employers with policies who comply with these safeguards except those acting in bad faith, the legislature encourages the adoption and use of drug and alcohol testing procedures. And this in turn encourages reductions in drug and alcohol use generally. Immunity reduces the risk of drug and alcohol testing.
The Supreme Court has discretion to decide one, both, or neither of these issues. It may have granted further review to address the third issue on which Caseyâs sought review. But if the Supreme Court does address either of these two issues, it will have important consequences for Iowaâs workplaces. Weâll follow up when the Court issues its opinion.