Noel Clarke’s libel trial against The Guardian is drawing to a close. Clarke is best known for writing, directing and starring in The Hood Trilogy, and for his role in Doctor Who.
On 29 March 2021, the British Academy of Film, Television and the Arts (‘BAFTA’) announced that Mr Clarke would receive its honorary award for Outstanding British Contribution to Cinema, but a month later, The Guardian published a string of allegations of bullying and sexual misconduct against Mr Clarke. BAFTA suspended its award and Mr Clarke’s membership until further notice, stating that it was ‘grateful that The Guardian was able to provide a platform where the victims were able to identify themselves, and to come forward and tell their stories’. Mr Clarke subsequently sued the newspaper. The trial commenced on 5 March 2025 and is expected to conclude this week.
Mr Clarke’s claim in libel and breach of his data protection rights, concerns seven articles and a podcast first published between April 2021 and March 2022. The articles reported on allegations of sexual misconduct made by some 20 women who had interacted with Mr Clarke professionally. They included claims of sexually inappropriate behaviour, including inappropriate comments both on and off set, and the taking and sharing of sexually explicit images and videos without consent – including the non-consensual filming of a naked audition. Clarke denies all the allegations.
The Guardian is defending the articles complained of on the grounds that they were both substantially true and reported on matters of public interest. In 2024, The Guardian served 34 witness statements, of which 28 were adduced in support of the defence of truth, and six were adduced from journalists and editors at The Guardian, in support of the public interest defence (sections 2 and 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 respectively).
The trial is among the most significant libel cases in recent years. Below, we summarise some of the key events in the case along the way, which include no less than seven pre-trial judgments.
Trial of preliminary issues to determine meaning
As is now a common practice in defamation claims, a preliminary trial hearing to determine, in particular, the meaning of the words complained of by Clarke was held in November 2023 (Clarke v Guardian News & Media Ltd (Re Preliminary Issues) [2023] EWHC 2734 (KB))
Mr Justice Johnson rejected Mr Clarke’s argument that the articles complained of conveyed the highest level of defamatory meaning (a so-called Chase level 1 meaning) – that he was guilty of sexual misconduct. Instead, it was determined that the articles suggested that there were “strong grounds to believe” Mr Clarke was guilty of various forms of sexual harassment.
You can read more about the preliminary hearing and its implications for the substantive trial in our blog, here.
Anonymity orders granted for six witnesses
The court granted anonymity orders for six of The Guardian’s witnesses, whose evidence at trial has been subject to reporting restrictions. These witnesses were six women, some of whom The Guardian said were well known actors, whose testimony in the primary article of 29 April 2021 (headlined ‘‘Sexual predator’: actor Noel Clarke accused of groping, harassment and bullying by 20 women”) had been anonymised at their request.
The strike out application
On 31 December 2024, Mr Clarke filed an application to strike out The Guardian’s Defence entirely or, alternatively, specific paragraphs relating to its public interest defence. In a supporting witness statement, Mr Clarke’s legal team accused three Guardian journalists, including Head of Investigations Paul Lewis, of perverting the course of justice by deleting disclosable messages and fabricating correspondence to replace the deleted communications. Mr Clarke’s lawyers argued that this conduct rendered a fair trial impossible and undermined The Guardian’s ability to claim it had reasonably believed publication was in the public interest at the time of publication. The application was heard on 29 January 2025.
For the application to succeed, the claimant was required to show, on the balance of probabilities, that:-
- that the deletion of messages constituted an intentional effort to pervert justice; and
- that this action deprived Clarke of a fair trial.
It is well established that cogent evidence is required to justify a finding of fraud or other discreditable conduct. This principle reflects the court’s conventional perception that it is generally not likely that people will engage in such conduct; where a claimant seeks to prove a case of dishonesty, its inherent improbability means the evidence to prove it to must be all the stronger.
The application failed at both stage one and two, with Mrs Justice Steyn concluding, in an 8,000-word judgment (Clarke v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2025] EWHC 222 (KB)):-
On stage one:
The judge found no evidence of any attempt by The Guardian journalists to pervert the course of justice. The messages in question had been deleted long before the litigation was in real contemplation and were shown to have been deleted in accordance with The Guardian’s data retention policies.
As for the allegations of fabrication, the Steyn J said:-
“I can take the fabrication of evidence point shortly. Although this extremely serious allegation has been made, repeatedly, by solicitors and Counsel for the claimant, it has no foundation. The claimant’s application and supporting evidence left entirely vague what, if any, evidence Mr Lewis, or anyone else, is accused of fabricating.
In oral submissions, Counsel for the claimant, sought to assert that the term fabrication was justified because the deletion of documents altered the overall impression. It was said that the deletion of some threads of evidence, modifying the story, was “an attempt to swindle” the claimant.
The approach taken by the claimant’s representatives is unacceptable: deletion is not fabrication, and such a grave allegation should not have been made and publicly aired without foundation.”
On stage two:
The application also “independently fails on the ground that such deletion of evidence as has occurred does not render a fair trial impossible. Far from it…” The truth defence was being run primarily on the oral evidence of witnesses, and in relation to the public interest defence “thousands of documents have been served as well as substantial witness statements…For the reasons I have given, the application to strike out the Amended Defence fails both on the grounds that the defendant has not perverted or attempted to pervert the course of justice, and because such limited pre-action deletion of documents as has occurred is not such as to preclude a fair trial of the claim.”
The cross-examination application
Mr Clarke’s team also made an application seeking to cross-examine The Guardian’s Paul Lewis on the deleted communications during the strike out application. This was heard immediately before the strike out application itself on 29 January 2025 and was the subject of a separate judgment (Clarke v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2025] EWHC 180 (KB))
Under CPR 32.7(1) provides that when at a hearing other than a trial, a party may apply to the court for permission to cross-examine the person giving the evidence. Mr Clarke’s lawyer argued that there is limited guidance on the circumstances under which the court may exercise its discretion under CPR 32.7(1). Relying on Jenington International Inc v Assaubayev [2010] EWHC 2351 (Ch) – a case addressing an application to cross-examine a witness statement relating to asset disclosure under a freezing injunction – Mr Clarke’s lawyer contended the courts possess a “broad and unfettered” discretion to order cross-examination whenever it is deemed just and convenient to do so.
The Judge disagreed and set out the correct approach to determining when the courts have discretion under CPR 32.7(1). Crucially, since Jenington, the Court of Appeal had made clear that the correct starting point is that “English law does not generally permit, save by consent, depositions, in other words oral interrogation of an opposing party, except at trial where that party has chosen to give evidence.” The discretion of the court to order cross-examination pre-trial is an exceptional measure, reserved for exceptional situations, and the court must be astute to guard against any attempt by a claimant to “extract by cross-examination under order of the court, material upon which to build his case for the substantive hearing” (Stokoe Partnership Solicitors v Grayson [2021] EWCA Civ 626, citing Yukong Line Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corporation of Liberia (The Rialto) [1996] EWCA Civ 759).
In refusing the application, the Judge concluded: “In my judgment, either the claimant can make out his strike out application on the written evidence, in which case, cross-examination is unnecessary, or he cannot, in which case the matter will proceed to trial. This is very far from the kind of exceptional case in which the discretion to permit oral interrogation of an opposing party prior to trial should be exercised”
The application to add six new defendants and re-amend the claim
On 8 January 2025, Mr Clarke served an application to amend his claim to introduce a new cause of action for unlawful means conspiracy and to add six additional defendants (‘the Amendment Application’). He alleged that several of The Guardian’s sources had conspired to provide false information to the newspaper regarding his alleged sexual misconduct, motivated, he contends, by personal and financial grievances against him.
In her judgment, (Clarke v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2025] EWHC 142 (KB)) Steyn J adjourned the application until after the ongoing trial to determine liability in the libel/data protection claim. The rationale for the adjournment was primarily that the outcome of the libel trial would significantly influence any subsequent conspiracy trial. During the libel trial, Mr Clarke’s counsel would have the opportunity to challenge the credibility of the 22 women intended to testify in support of the truth defence and put it to them that their statements were fabricated as part of a conspiracy to harm him. Similarly, Mr Clarke’s counsel would be free to cross-examine the journalists as to their honesty and motivations at the time of publication.
The Judge highlighted the late timing of Mr Clarke’s Amendment Application, emphasising the potential prejudice to the defendant and the risk of jeopardising the trial schedule, if granted. She further noted that Mr Clarke’s conspiracy claim was not sufficiently particularised for such a serious claim involving allegations of dishonesty and malice. However, Mr Clarke was permitted to amend his reply to The Guardian’s Defence to include allegations that The Guardian’s investigation failed to adequately verify or scrutinise sources hostile to him.
Mr Clarke’s team applied for permission to appeal the judge’s decision to adjourn the Amendment Application on the grounds that she was wrong in law, and that the adjournment would effectively stifle Mr Clarke’s legitimate claim in unlawful means conspiracy.
The Court of Appeal granted permission for the appeal, but swiftly dismissed the appeal itself, endorsing Steyn J’s decision to adjourn the Amendment Application (Clarke v Guardian News & Media Ltd (Rev1) [2025] EWCA Civ 164). Lord Justice Warby noted that the appeal overlooked practical trial-management considerations; accepting the proposed amendments and joinders would require extensive preparation, estimated at five to six weeks, rendering it impossible to preserve the scheduled trial date. In the other alternative, proceeding with a trial based on the amended claims against the existing defendant would have been undesirable for Mr Clarke, as the outcome would be binding on The Guardian only. The only viable options were either to adjourn the trial entirely for months, causing substantial prejudice to the defendant and third parties, or to proceed with the libel trial as planned and adjourn the Amendment Application.
The Court of Appeal found no legal error in the Judge’s case management decision and agreed that any prejudice to the claimant was outweighed by the broader interests of justice.
The appeal judgment considered but did not provide a definitive answer on the question of whether, procedurally, it is mandatory for a proposed new defendant to be given notice of the application to join them into an existing action. In this case, Mr Clarke did serve notice of the application on the prospective defendants and was subsequently ordered to pay the costs of them attending the hearing. Despite the adverse cost implications for Mr Clarke in this case, the Judge considered it was correct procedurally. Warby LJ commented: “…the Judge was right to find the rules require an application of this kind to be served not only on any existing party to the litigation but also on a proposed additional defendant. But the opposite view is certainly arguable, as is clear from the judgment of Phillips LJ, which I have seen in draft. It is a point of wider importance and in another case, it would merit detailed investigation. I do not however think it matters in the present case.”
The disclosure applications
During disclosure, The Guardian provided 142 audio files (recordings of telephone calls) made during its journalistic investigation into Mr Clarke. Of these, 60 were provided for inspection while 82 were withheld under section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (‘CCA 1981’) to protect the paper’s sources. The Guardian contemporaneously produced AI-generated transcripts of 77 of these files for journalistic purposes, and disclosed copies to Mr Clarke, subject to redactions.
The AI-generated generated transcripts were of varying quality. Some were unintelligible or nonsensical in parts. For instance, the AI-software often mistook the name ‘Noel’ for ‘no’. The Guardian subsequently opted to obtain certified professional transcripts of the audio files – which it said at the time would be required for trial – and proposed sharing these transcripts with Mr Clarke, provided he agreed to split the costs. Mr Clarke refused, insisting that if The Guardian intended to rely on the certified transcripts, they must be disclosed in any event.
The Guardian, contrary to its initial position, elected not to disclose the certified transcripts, claiming they were not necessary for trial.
When Mr Clarke threatened a specific disclosure application, The Guardian argued that as the certified transcripts were ‘brought into existence for the dominant purpose of conducting the claim’, they therefore attracted litigation privilege and were not disclosable.
Four working days before the trial, Mr Clarke applied for specific disclosure of the certified transcripts, and an order requiring The Guardian to remove redactions which fall outside CCA 1981, s 10. This application was heard on the second day of trial.
Steyn J rejected The Guardian’s argument that the transcripts were subject to litigation privilege because they were prepared for the dominant purpose of litigation (Clarke v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2025] EWHC 550 (KB)).
The transcribed conversations were not themselves privileged, and as per Property Alliance Group Ltd v RBS (No 3) [2015] EWHC 3341 (Ch), and Parry v News Group Newspapers Limited [1990] 140 NLJ 1719 (CA) a transcript of a non-privileged conversation cannot itself be privileged. Nevertheless, the Judge refused the application to order specific disclosure in this case, because: –
- Mr Clarke’s application was not adequately focused. He requested the disclosure of 77 certified transcripts when he had only placed 12 of the existing versions in the trial bundle.
- Mr Clarke’s application had failed to explain why the certified transcripts were of importance to his case. Many of the requested documents had already been disclosed to him in audio and/or AI transcribed format already. The judge rejected the argument that disclosure of additional material might reveal evidence of The Guardian journalists asking leading questions, as there was no basis to believe the extensive disclosed material was inadequate to demonstrate the journalists’ methods.
- Ordering the redaction and disclosure of the transcripts would be onerous for The Guardian to comply with and potentially disrupt the trial. Mr Clarke had known about the transcripts since October 2024, and yet the application for their disclosure had been made a very late stage in proceedings, without adequate explanation for the delay.
In summary, Steyn J concluded: “the fact that this application was only made on the eve of the trial, in circumstances where it could have been made months or at the very least weeks earlier, the lateness of the application does undermine the Claimant’s contention that the certified transcripts are necessary for the liability trial… If a narrower more focused application had been made, backed up by a compelling explanation as to why this material is necessary for the fair disposal of the liability trial, the lateness of the application would not have been decisive”
As to Mr Clarke’s application for the removal of redactions, The Guardian successfully argued that the redactions were essential to safeguard its confidential journalistic sources, and that there were no grounds to challenge the redactions that had been applied by qualified solicitors assessing the content on a ‘text-level and cell-level basis’. Once information has protection under Section 10 of the 1981 Act, it falls to the applicant to demonstrate to the Court that disclosure should be ordered. Mr Clarke’s application failed to demonstrate a compelling need to override the public interest in source protection.
The Judge again highlighted the late submission of the application, noting that ordering The Guardian to review thousands of documents was impractical and it risked undermining their ability to prepare adequately for trial. The application was refused.
The trial
The libel trial will determine The Guardian’s liability only, with any questions of damages and/or other relief to be determined later if need be.
A full blog on the trial itself and analysis of the judgment will follow.
