By Scott Hamilton
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By Scott Hamilton
Aug. 31, 2026, © Leeham News and Analysis: Today is my last day as a full-fledged participant in Leeham News and Analysis (LNA).
When LNA was sold to AIN Media Group in July 2025, a two-year contract for me was included, with a provision that AIN would strive to find my successor as editor within a year. Howard Hardee assumed the editor’s slot on July 1 this year. I became editor-at-large.
I remain under contract until next July, but at a reduced level, which gives me the free time to pursue my bucket list of things to see and places to go. I’ll contribute articles for LNA from time to time and provide advice on business development and related issues.
I’ve been closely following Airbus and Boeing since 1992. That’s when Boeing led an industry effort to adopt international standards for the recovery of airliners leased to or purchased by distressed airlines. Under US bankruptcy law, lenders and lessors could repossess the aircraft after a 60-day waiting period following the airline’s bankruptcy filing. No such mechanism existed for non-US carriers.
Led by Scott Scherer of what was then Boeing Capital Corp., the Boeing-led effort was successful. By law, distressed or bankrupt carriers in default had to turn over their aircraft after a court filing and approval. In practice, courts often ignored the new international standard, much to the frustration of the lessor or lender.
My coverage shifted to Boeing and Airbus as complaints about “illegal” subsidies began to rear their ugly heads. Boeing complained Airbus obtained illegal subsidies that enabled it to undercut Boeing’s pricing. Airbus picked up the refrain and countered with similar complaints. This debate continued in one form or another for the following 30-plus years.
Airbus Overtakes Boeing, Begins Mimicking It
Having followed Airbus and Boeing closely since then (and to a lesser extent, Embraer), I’m in a good position to draw conclusions over three decades about these companies.
There is no question that Airbus succeeded in overtaking Boeing as the world’s leading airplane manufacturer, beginning in about 2004. There are many reasons for this. To get right to the point today, I’ll say this: there are now trends at Airbus that I find really disturbing.
In March 2023, I wrote in Pontifications, “Complacency, arrogance aren’t a Boeing exclusive.”
I began that article, “Airbus is resting on its laurels while Boeing struggles to recover from one crisis after another since the March 2019 grounding of the global 737 Max fleet.
“Multiple sources tell me that Airbus, aside from the production problems it has in common with Boeing, is enjoying Boeing’s deep freeze by China. The decision by Boeing CEO David Calhoun to delay the ‘introduction’ of a new airplane until the middle of the next decade took the pressure off Airbus to be ready to move sooner rather than later.
“While Boeing struggles, Airbus has become conservative, complacent and—gasp—even arrogant, a longtime Boeing trait.”
The rest of the article provided some examples of this thesis.
Called on the Carpet
Boy, did that cause a stir. I received a call from Airbus communications complaining about the article. A call like this was routine for Boeing, which often whined about things I wrote (my journalistic peers received similar calls) to the point where the phone calls arguably crossed into harassment and intimidation.
But Airbus never had done this, at least not with me.
Within days, I was on a Zoom with the comms person, the department head, and the CEO of Airbus Commercial. I held my ground, of course.
What I’ve seen since that 2023 date hasn’t been a trend in the right direction.
Under the administration of Guillaume Faury, the CEO, and Julie Kitcher, the chief sustainability officer and communications at Airbus (the latter being the relevant position for this discussion), Airbus has been slowly shifting its media focus away from veteran aviation reporters in favor of 18-to-35-year-old “influencers,” citing TikTok specifically as an “influencer” outlet.
Veteran aviation reporters began falling out of favor. One of the best technical aviation reporters still around was deemed too old. So was I. Bjorn Fehrm, an aerospace engineer by training, also fell off the invite list for a time.
I suspected there was a hidden agenda. People like us old-timers and LNA know commercial aviation inside out. “Influencers,” by and large, don’t have a thimble of knowledge that the aviation veterans have. Maybe this is partly the point of favoring them.
Who Do the Influencers Influence?
Who are these influencers there to influence? Certainly not the Tim Clarks, Michael O’Learys and Scott Kirbys of the world.
Says an insider: the 18-to-35-year-old influencer strategy is to promote to up-and-comers that Airbus is a cool place to work and build a career. Which is all well and good, but not at the expense of journalists who truly know what they are writing about.
Another disturbing trend: Airbus used to be forthright when questions were posed. Today, Airbus is more like Boeing pre-Kelly Ortberg. Answers are often ambiguous rather than informative—though admittedly this is a hit-or-miss complaint.
Planned presentations degenerated into advertising vehicles rather than informational content. There was no pre-air show briefing this year, the first time in my memory when there was no briefing.
During the era of CEO Tom Enders and his communications head, Rainer Ohler, Airbus executives were commonly available either via headquarters or field offices. Today, Airbus is more like Boeing; executives are rarely available for interviews.
Today’s Airbus also retaliates against a journalist who wrote something executives disliked by freezing him or her out, just like the “old” Boeing. It’s true that John Leahy, the former COO of Customers, regularly put a reporter on ice, including me (three times), but communications largely continued to cooperate behind the scenes.
Supply Chain Flip
For years, beginning with CEO Jim McNerney, Boeing beat up suppliers under the program called Partnering for Success. This misleading title was used to squeeze the profit margins of Boeing’s supply partners. Many earned double-digit margins compared with Boeing’s single-digit profits. Boeing demanded price cuts under the threat of being replaced. Suppliers called it Preparing for Sacrifice or Preparing for Poverty.
Airbus also had a program to cut costs, but even suppliers—notably those common to both companies—said Airbus’ approach was more collaborative than combative.
However, today Boeing is characterized by a series of crises and is humbled, while Airbus has become more arrogant. Boeing is now called transparent, and some suppliers complain that Airbus is no longer, reflecting the “old” Boeing.
Shareholder Value
More concerning than the media policies is the increasing emphasis on shareholder value.
For anyone who has followed Boeing since 1997, when its top priorities became shareholder value, shareholder value, shareholder value, and everything else thereafter, this is cause for raised eyebrows.
LNA editor Howard Hardee touched on the announcement concurrent with Farnborough International Airshow that more emphasis will be placed on shareholder value. I wrote about this as far back as April 2023. The timing was not coincidental with the come-to-Jesus meeting I had with Airbus over arrogance and complacency.
Thomas Topfer, the CFO of Airbus Group, laid out the new emphasis in an investors’ briefing concurrent with Farnborough.
“It’s now the right time to accelerate shareholder returns; therefore, we are launching a €5 billion share buyback program to be executed over a three-year time horizon subject…to continued shareholder approval,” Topfer told analysts. “This marks clearly a significant step change over the past four years we returned €7.2 billion to our investors through regular and special dividends. With this new program, we are expanding that commitment. We expect total cash returns over the 2026 to 2029 period to represent around 60% of our accumulated free cash flow generation.”
Reserving Money for Product Development
At least Airbus has limited the shareholder returns to 60% of free cash flow. Boeing committed to returning 100% of free cash flow to shareholders, leaving limited room for product development. Boeing suspended dividends and share buybacks following the second 737 Max crash in March 2019.
“Importantly, I would like to emphasize, of course, this share buyback is a targeted tactical move based on our current strengths rather than a permanent recurring annual commitment,” Topfer said. He said that this ensures that Airbus will “continuously drive long-term shareholder value while fully preserving our strategic flexibility. These strategic levers mark our transition into a value-driven phase for Airbus, and as we scale past 1,100 deliveries and surpass the triple-digit revenue mark, our success is driven by disciplined execution across commercial aircraft, defense, space, and helicopters alike.
“Our structural cash generation enables us to invest in our future while accelerating shareholder returns at the same time. We’re delivering on this through our continued commitment to a progressive dividend policy which will be complemented by the €5 billion share buyback program, and these actions demonstrate our focus on consistent value,” Topfer said.
LNA was told long ago that institutional shareholders were pressing Airbus for more value. Although Airbus hasn’t gone to “full Boeing” yet, by dedicating 100% of free cash flow to shareholders, the trend is worrying, nevertheless.
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